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Abstract
Purpose: While the main purpose of reporting – e.g., reporting for
taxes – is to gauge the economic state of a company, the fact that reporting is done at pre-determined dates distorts the reporting results. For
example, to create a larger impression of their productivity, companies
fire temporary workers before the reporting date and re-hire then right
away. The purpose of this study is to decide how to avoid such distortion.
Design/methodology/approach: We want to make our solution
applicable for all possible reasonable optimality criteria. Thus, we use a
general formalism for describing and analyzing all such criteria.
Findings: We show that most distortion problems will disappear if
we replace the fixed pre-determined reporting dates with individualized
random reporting dates. We also show that for all reasonable optimality
criteria, the optimal way to assign reporting dates it to do it uniformly.
Originality/value: We propose a new idea of replacing the fixed
pre-determining reporting dates with randomized ones. On the informal
level, this idea may have been proposed earlier, but what is completely
new is our analysis of which probability distribution for reporting dates
is the best for economy: it turns out that under all reasonable optimality
criteria, uniform distribution works the best.
Keywords: Tax reporting; Disruption caused by fixed reporting dates;
Randomized reporting dates; Optimal distribution of reporting dates.

1
1.1

Formulation of the Problem
Need for some government regulations and government control

Until the 20th century, there was not much government intervention in economy, the belief was that the “invisible hand” of the markets – using the famous
1

expression by Adam Smith – would magically bring economic growth and economic prosperity. From this viewpoint, the smaller the government role, the
better: medicine, education, etc., are better in private hands. Possibly only the
army needs to be controlled by the state – but the supply of the army should
be in private hands. The resulting relaxation of government intervention led to
economic growth – but also to deep crises.
The last such catastrophic crisis occurred in the late 1920s-1930s. This crisis
was the last straw that convinced sceptics all over the world that some government intervention in economy is necessary. Of course, many countries overdid
it, and introduced too much government control – which also had a negative
effect on economy, but the fact that nowadays, pandemic notwithstanding, the
economy is improving all over the world has shown that a correct compromise
between too little and too much government intervention has been found.
This intervention occurs on different levels: on the level of the state banks
that regulate interest rates and thus, regulate the economy, and on the level
of government spending. The government collects taxes and spends them on
education, research, and development – with the ultimate goal to help economy
– and on the social welfare.

1.2

How taxes and government regulations are determined
now

In most countries, taxes are collected on a yearly or quarterly basis: the amount
of taxes depends on the financial situation by a certain date. Similarly, the
government regulations depend on the state of economy by a certain data –
e.g., by the level of economic growth, unemployment, inflation, etc. at the end
of each quarter.

1.3

Why this is a problem

The main purpose of tax reporting to provide a clear picture of the state of each
company (and of the economy as a whole). However, the very fact that this is
gauged by the state of the company at a certain date distorts the picture.
For example, the company’s productivity – one of the important characteristics determining the company’s stock price – is obtained, crudely speaking,
by dividing the profit by the number of workers. At first glance, this is exactly
what productivity is, but the problem is that, based on the way reporting is
set, the profit is the whole profit during the whole reporting period, while the
number of workers is the number of workers at the reporting date. So, to create
a better impression of the productivity, a company may (and some do) fire temporary workers just before the reporting date and re-hire them once the date
has passed.
There are many other similar well-known distortions. It even affects private
life. For example, in the US, in many cases, it is better tax-wise to get married
in early January than in December, etc.
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The governments are very familiar with these problems, they are always
updating the tax rules – but still, some new loopholes are found again and
again; see, e.g., [1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 13].

1.4

What we do in this paper

In this paper, we use the general ideas of decision theory – see, e.g., [3, 4, 7,
8, 10, 12, 14] – to show that to avoid the above problems, there is a straightforward – but somewhat radical – solution: to replace the fixed reporting dates
with randomized dates. We also show that the optimal way to arrange these
randomized reporting dates is to use the uniform distribution.
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2.1

Main Idea
Doping testing for athletes: situation with similar possible problems

In professional sports, doping is a big problem, when prohibited chemical substances are used to boost the athletes’ performance. To prevent this from happening, athletes are periodically tested for the presence of different possible
prohibited substances.
It is well known that in such a situation, tests performed at known dates do
not make much sense: the athlete intending to cheat will simply stop using the
illegal drug shortly before the test and then resume using it immediately after.
The known solution to this problem is to have tests at random times.

2.2

Testing at random times is exactly what we propose
for economic reporting

Testing at random times is exactly what we propose to solve the above economic
problems. If the company does not know at what day it will be required to report
its number of workers, it makes no sense to distort the productivity statistics
by firing people only to immediately re-hire them. If tax deadline is randomly
determined at an unpredictable time, there is no tax advantage in delaying
marriage.
With this change, the reporting will more adequately reflect the current state
of the economy.

2.3

Additional advantage of the proposed scheme

At present, when everyone has the same deadline for reporting taxes, accountants who help with this reporting are overworked right before the due date –
and under-worked at all other times. Similarly, the tax services are overwhelmed
immediately after the tax deadline – which creates delays for taxpayers who
over-paid to get money back.
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If we make tax dates individually random, then both the accountants who
help the taxpayers and the government agency that processes tax returns will
have their work spread more equally, thus drastically decreasing delays.

3
3.1

What Is the Best Way of Implementing This
Idea
Towards a precise formulation of the problem

The fact that the reporting times are random means that we cannot predetermine these times, all we can do is determine the probability that the
randomized reporting time will happen at different time intervals. One way
to describe this is to describe the density f (t) of reporting times, i.e., the expected number of reporting times per given time interval – so that for each
time interval [t, t], the expected number of reporting times within this interval
Rt
is equal to t f (t) dt.
From this viewpoint, the problem is – what is the optimal density f (t)?

3.2

What do we mean by optimal? Problems with the
traditional approach

The usual way to describe what is optimal is to select an objective function, and
to pick up an alternative for which the value of this objective function is the
largest (or, if we are minimizing, the smallest). There are two problems with
this usual approach.
The first problem is that often, it is not sufficient to describe a single objective function. Let us give an economy-related example. For a company, a
natural objective function is the overall expected profit – taking into account
future profits (with appropriate discounts). However, often, there are several
different alternative with the same expected profit. In this case, a reasonable
idea is to use this non-uniqueness to select, among the best-profit alternatives,
the one for which, e.g., the risk is the smallest. If there are still several alternatives with the same values of expected profit and the same value of expected
risk, we can use the remaining non-uniqueness to select the alternative for which
the effect of the environment will be the smallest – or the one that enables the
company to preserve most of its workforce. In all these cases, the criterion
by which the company selects an alternative is more complicated than using a
single objective function.
The second problem with the usual approach is that for different objective
functions, we get, in general, different optimal solutions. So, instead of trying
to pick a single objective function, it is desirable to come up with a way to find
an alternative that is optimal with respect to all reasonable objective functions.
Let us see how we can overcome both problems.
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3.3

Comment: without losing generality, we can consider
only maximizing objective functions

In some cases, we are looking for objective functions that maximize. In other
cases, we are looking for alternatives that minimize the given objective function
F (x) – e.g., we want to minimize the risk. This can be reduced to maximization
if instead of the original objective function F (x), we consider a new objective
def

function Fnew (x) = −F (x). Clearly, maximizing Fnew (x) = −F (x) is equivalent to minimizing F (x).
So, every minimization problem can be easily reformulated as a maximization
problem. Thus, without losing generality, we can restrict ourselves to the case
of maximizing objective functions.

3.4

Towards a general description of optimality

In the usual description of optimality, for maximizing objective functions we
select an objective function F (x), and we say that an alternative a is better than
an alternative b if F (a) > F (b). If F (a) = F (b), we say that the alternatives a
and b are of the same value with respect to the given criterion. We say that an
alternative a is optimal of F (a) ≥ F (b) for all alternatives b.
As we have mentioned earlier, if there are several optimal alternatives, then
we can use this non-uniqueness to optimize some other objective function G(x).
In this case, we have a more complicated criterion for comparing two alternatives:
• we say that an alternative a is better than an alternative b, if either
F (a) > F (b), or we have F (a) = F (b) and G(a) > G(b);
• we say that an alternative a is of the same quality as an alternative b with
respect to our optimality criterion if we have F (a) = F (b) and G(a) =
G(b).
We say that an alternative a is optimal if it is either better or of the same quality
as all other alternatives.
As we have mentioned, even after this refinement, we can still have several
optimal alternatives. In this case, we can use this non-uniqueness to optimize
some other objective function H(x). Then, we get even more complicated ideas
of which alternative is better and what it means for an alternative to be optimal.
How can we come up with a general definition that covers all such settings?
From the viewpoint of the decision maker, what we really need is a way to
compare the alternatives.
• For some pairs (a, b) of alternatives, we want to conclude that a is better
than b; we will denote this by a > b.
• For some other pairs (a, b), we want to conclude that the alternatives a
and b are of the same quality with respect to the given optimality criterion.
We will denote this by a ∼ b.
5

Of course, these conclusions must be consistent: e.g., if a is better than b, and
b is better than c, then we should be able to conclude that a is better than c.
Thus, it makes sense to define a general optimality criterion as a pair of
relations (>, ∼). Once such relations are given, we say that an alternative a is
optimal if for every other alternative b, we have either a > b or a ∼ b.
If there are several optimal alternatives, this means that the given optimality
criterion is not final: we can use this non-uniqueness to optimize some other
criterion and thus, in effect, to change the optimality criterion. So, when the criterion is final, there is only one optimal alternative. (Of course, there should be
at least one optimal alternative – otherwise, the optimality criterion is useless.)
So, we arrive at the following definition.

3.5

Definition 1

Let A be a set. Elements of this set will be called alternatives. By an optimality
criterion, we mean a pair (>, ∼) of binary relations on the set A for which the
following conditions hold for every three alternatives a, b, and c:
• if a > b and b > c, then a > c;
• if a > b and b ∼ c, then a > c;
• if a ∼ b and b > c, then a > c;
• if a ∼ b and b ∼ c, then a ∼ c;
• a ∼ a and a 6> a.
We say that an alternative a is optimal if for every other alternative b, we have
either a > b or a ∼ b. We say that the optimality criterion is final if there exists
exactly one optimal alternative.

3.6

From general definition of optimality to our problem

In our case, alternatives are different density functions f (t). The main problems
with the traditional deterministic setting of reporting dates are caused by the
fact that these dates are fixed to some moments of time, while the reasonable
objective functions – prosperity of the country, prosperity of the company, etc.
– should not depend on an arbitrarily chosen date. Let us describe this notdepending in precise terms.
Suppose that we change the US tax report date from the current April 15 to
some other date, e.g., to April 13. This means, in effect, that what corresponded
to day t now corresponds to day t + t0 , where, in this case, t0 = 2 days. So,
what was previously the density f (t) becomes f (t + t0 ).
This simple shift should not change the relative quality of two densities: if
we had f > g, then we should have the same relation for the shifted densities.
Thus, we arrive at the following definition.
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3.7

Definition 2

Let (>, ∼) be an optimality criterion on the set all non-negative functions f (t);
we will call such functions density functions. For each function f (t) and for each
value t0 , we can define a shifted function St0 (f ) for which (St0 (f ))(t) = f (t+t0 ).
We say that the optimality criterion is shift-invariant if f > g implies that
St0 (f ) > St0 (g), and f ∼ g implies that St0 (f ) ∼ St0 (g).

3.8

Main Result

For every shift-invariant final optimality criterion, the optimal density function
is a constant.

3.9

Discussion

Thus, for all reasonable optimality criteria, the uniform distribution of recording
dates works the best.
This result is similar to several results proven in [11].

3.10

Proof

Let fopt be the optimal function. This means that for every other function
g, we have either fopt > g or fopt ∼ g. In particular, for every g, we have
fopt > S−t0 (g) or fopt ∼ S−t0 (g). Due to shift-invariance, this implies that
either St0 (fopt ) > St0 (S−t0 (g)) = g or St0 (fopt ) ∼ g.
Since this is true for all alternatives g, this means that the alternative
St0 (fopt ) is also optimal. However, since the optimality criterion is final, there
is only one optimal alternative. So, we must have St0 (fopt ) = fopt for all t0 .
This means that fopt (t + t0 ) = fopt (t) for all t and t0 . For every two values
t and t0 , by taking t0 = t0 − t, we conclude that fopt (t) = fopt (t0 ). Thus, the
function fopt (t) is indeed constant.
The proposition is proven.
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